Opportunities and Risks of Blockchain Technologies – A Research Agenda by Lindman, Juho et al.
  
Opportunities and risks of Blockchain 
Technologies in payments– a research agenda 
 
Juho Lindman 
University of 
Gothenburg/Chalmers 
 juho.lindman@ait.gu.se   
Matti Rossi 
Aalto University School of 
Business  
 matti.rossi@aalto.fi  
Virpi Kristiina Tuunainen 
Aalto University School of 
Business 
 virpi.tuunainen@aalto.fi  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Blockchain technologies offer new open source-
based opportunities for developing new types of digital 
platforms and services. While research on the topic is 
emerging, it has this far been predominantly focused to 
technical and legal issues. To broaden our 
understanding of blockchain technology based services 
and platforms, we build on earlier literature on 
payments and payment platforms and propose a 
research agenda divided into three focal areas of 1) 
organizational issues; 2) issues related to the 
competitive environment; and 3) technology design 
issues. We discuss several salient themes within each 
of these areas, and derive a set of research question for 
each theme, highlighting the need to address both risks 
and opportunities for users, as well as different types 
of stakeholder organizations. With this research 
agenda, we contribute to the discussion on future 
avenues for Information Systems research on 
blockchain technology based platforms and services.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Blockchain technologies are touted as one of the 
most significant technical innovations in digitalization 
of asset ownership1. Blockchain has been demonstrated 
to be a versatile programmable platform for managing 
contracts and ownership and providing an audit trail 
that cannot be easily tampered with, but can be 
distributed in real time [1]. Pervasive market 
penetration of novel cloud-connected mobile devices - 
including wearables - in combination with cloud-based 
data storage and analytics enable new types of 
distributed payment and transaction platforms that can 
be built as an overlay on top of traditional financial 
services and banking systems. In extreme cases – as 
                                                
1 https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-future-of-financial-
infrastructure-an-ambitious-look-at-how-blockchain-can-reshape-
financial-services 
with distributed cryptocurrencies – not even a trusted 
third party such as a central bank is required.  
These novel transaction and payment platforms 
allow for the development of a range of innovative 
financial instruments, such as micro-payments, peer-to-
peer lending or non-regulated money enabling banking 
for the about 2.5 billion “non-banking” population2, 
while at the same time they can potentially simplify 
and lower the cost of transactions for example in cross-
border payments 3. Any digital representation of 
money is relative to the underlying computing 
technology and the digital payments we have seen so 
far have reflected a transactional computing model of 
manipulating rather stable entities. Thus, the current 
transformation is related to “money” and “cash” 
adapting to the decentralized nature of computing, 
which allow for different industrial and societal trust 
arrangements, for example distributed peerless and 
anonymous international money transfer services and 
even marriages4 based on smart contracts. 
These decentralized platforms offer new 
possibilities for anonymity, as they offer a vision of 
anonymous digital currencies, which can be a bit 
exaggerated. At the same time, these platforms also 
challenge the existing identity management systems 
and suggest new ones. To better understand these 
opportunities and challenges, research on mitigating 
risks and leveraging opportunities of digitalization and 
decentralization of payment platforms enabled by 
blockchain technologies is clearly called for.  We also 
need deeper theoretical understanding of both how 
these platforms and services are designed, developed 
and organized, as well what is acceptable for users and 
how they perceive trust in the digital and decentralized 
world. 
So far, the studies on the fairly recently introduced 
blockchain technology have predominantly focused on 
                                                
2 http://mckinseyonsociety.com/half-the-world-is-unbanked/ 
3 http://www.economist.com/news/ special-report/21650295-orit-
next-big-thing 
4 http://www.coindesk.com/prenup-ethereum-marriage-obligations/ 
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technology issues; aimed at addressing different 
technical challenges that such distributed systems pose  
[2, 3]. Another main research area has been the legal 
frameworks and their applicability (see e.g. [4, 5]). 
Now as the number of users of services based is 
increasing, more research on payment and asset 
management systems and service platforms in the 
disciplines of Information Systems and Management is 
called for [6, 7].  
In what follows we first review the key literature 
that has addressed blockchain technology so far. We 
also provide a review on the essential literature on 
digitization of payments and payment platforms as the 
primary context for utilization of blockchain 
technologies. We will then identify a research gap by 
pinpointing where our understanding is still 
underdeveloped.  
As our main contribution, we outline a more 
holistic research agenda for studying the development 
and utilization of blockchain technology, with 
particular emphasis on digital payments and payment 
platforms. Furthermore, we suggest possible research 
problem areas and derived research questions for IS 
researchers to seek answers to.  
 
2. Literature review 
 
In this section, we will begin by providing an 
introduction to blockchain technology including 
definitions, after which we will discuss the growing 
body of literature on the first serious application of it, 
Bitcoin cryptocurrency. We will then provide a brief 
overview of the earlier literature on the broader context 
of payments and payment platforms, and conclude with 
a summary of the identified research gaps. For the 
purposes of this paper, the literature review presented 
is intentionally concise, while number of systematic 
literature reviews can be found on various areas of 
digital payments (see e.g. [8]).  
 
2.1. Key definitions  
 
Digital payments are simply payments that are 
conducted through digital means, for example as near 
field communication transactions between electronic 
wallet and a cash register, or through digital money [9]. 
Consequently digital platform is “a proprietary or open 
modular layered technological architecture that 
support efficient development of innovative derivatives, 
which are embedded in a business or social 
context.”[10] Blockchain can be seen as one such 
platform. 
Blockchain technology is a sequential distributed 
database where the entire earlier transaction history  is 
stored and shared in a (block) chain in a public ledger 
[6]. Blockchains are normally used with 
cryptocurrencies i.e. currencies that use public-key 
cryptography as security measure and to prevent 
counterfeiting transactions. Blockchain can be seen 
both as a technical and as an economic innovation [11]. 
As a technical innovation, it is a new version of 
database transaction technology especially for 
decentralized environments of limited or imperfect 
trust. As an economic innovation it offers novel tools 
to any problem domain where there exists a need for a 
reliable record of transactions – a ledger - in a 
decentralized environment where not all parties, 
whether humans or machines can be fully trusted. 
 
2.2. Bitcoin  
 
Bitcoin is the initial distributed transaction system 
(bitcoin protocol) and a coupled currency (bitcoin as an 
unit of account).  Bitcoin “infrastructure” consists of 
network of users, who have a client software running 
on their computer.  Bitcoin was first suggested in 2008 
and implemented as an open source project in 2009 by 
a person - or a group - calling himself or themselves 
Satoshi Nakamoto [12].  
Initial application of blockchain technology is the 
original public ledger of bitcoin, which has later 
inspired other implementations called altchains. These 
kinds of networks also provide trust-based services that 
are not limited to currency transactions: Bitnation.co –
decentralized “Non-Geographically Contingent 
Governance Service Aggregators”5 offering a “full 
range of services traditionally done by governments”6 
with blockchain as its core technology - even aims 
ambitiously to become a future legislative entity. 
The idea of the bitcoin system is that the entire 
earlier transaction history is verified by solving a 
cryptographic computation. This “work” – or 
computation time is extremely difficult to fake. This 
method is called “proof-of-work” (PoW). In a process 
called mining, blocks are created in about 10 minutes 
each, after which the solvers of the computation 
challenges are rewarded currency.  
Users of the system use the bitcoin protocol to send 
and receive payments to “wallets”, which are 
anonymous (however, see [13] on identifying IP 
addresses). Bitcoin protocol verifies each transaction. 
Bitcoin protocol development is an open source project 
supported by the Bitcoin Foundation, and the 
development efforts are supported by a global 
community of developers and entrepreneurs [3]. 
                                                
5 https://blog.bitnation.co/what-is-bitnation-the-googlement/ 
6 https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/qa-ceo-bitnation-1412110033 
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Lack of faith on established financial institutions, 
largely fueled by the financial meltdown of 2008 [14] 
has been established as one of the main drivers for 
development and proliferation of Bitcoin [3]). Another 
identified driver is the aim at frictionless payment 
systems [13, 15]. 
One prevailing question is whether Bitcoin should 
be understood primarily as a financial asset or as a 
system of payments (see for example [16] for more 
thorough discussion on their differences). If it is seen 
primarily as a financial asset, then the key issue is its 
financial performance and returns it provides as an 
asset. If it considered mostly as a payment system, key 
is then its scalability for very large transaction 
volumes. 
Brezo and Bringas [17] analyzed different risks 
related to Bitcoin and found that systems such as 
Bitcoin are quite vulnerable to speculation and 
misinformation. It has been contemplated that that the 
lack of coordination entity (e.g. central bank) is at the 
same time a strength and a weakness of this kind of 
decentralized payment and trust infrastructure, as there 
is less inertia to try new ideas, but users’ trust on the 
platform can rapidly erode, if for example forks occur 
in the development, as is currently happening in the 
case of Bitcoin7. In the area of open source research 
[18], different meanings of forks have been 
investigated, but forks usually refer to a situation 
where the developer community disagrees on the 
development roadmap (or other focal issues) and this 
results in a situation where several different competing 
versions of the code base are in use. In most open 
source projects forks are seen both as a safeguard of 
openness and as detrimental to the development efforts 
if they dilute contributions.   
Bitcoin continues to capture the interest of 
academics, practitioners and the public, and the 
uncertainties resulting from its decentralized nature as 
well as wide misconceptions surrounding it render 
Bitcoin an excellent target for academic enquiry.  
 
2.3. Potential of Blockchain technology  
 
Blockchain technology and the underlying 
distributed database technologies are the key 
technological enablers of recent developments in 
distributed transaction and ledger systems.   
Financial instruments, such as payments, trading 
records and smart contracts can be built on blockchain 
technology, which then prevents adverse behavior and 
repercussions, such as double-spending, forgeries and 
                                                
7 For more detailed explanation and discussion on Bitcoin forks, see 
https://blog.blockchain.com/2016/02/26/a-brief-history-of-bitcoin-
forks/ 
false disputes [15]. Furthermore, the technology can be 
used for legal and public records, such as titles, birth 
certificates, voting or court records. It can also be used 
for creation of “smart property” in which case 
blockchain becomes an inventory, tracking and buy-
sell mechanism for hard assets like diamonds or cars. It 
can also be used for tracing the product creation for 
socially responsible business. Blockchain can be 
utilized as a transactional mechanism for “sharing 
economy” services [19], as it naturally solves trusted 
recording of large-scale peer-to-peer activities. The 
importance of such a transactional mechanism 
increases with the emerging “Programmable World”8 
where an increasing amount of physical things become 
programmable and get connected to the Internet. 
While the technical community (including both 
computer science scholars and practitioners) have 
addressed and continue to address blockchain as a 
technology, our knowledge on its application beyond 
descriptive accounts and anecdotal evidence is quite 
thin. Particularly the opportunities and risks from 
business and societal (rather than technical) 
perspectives are not well understood.  
 
2.4. Payment systems and platforms 
 
In the development of digital payments, trust has 
remained a focal conundrum [20-22]. Mobile payment 
literature has argued for the need for trusted service 
manager (TSM) that handles authentication, 
authorization and account settlement [23], especially in 
the presence direct and indirect network effects [24]. 
Distributed transaction platforms are answering this 
challenge by radical decentralization based on peer-to-
peer networks. These are called “decentralized digital 
currencies” (Dccy) or “cryptocurrencies” and 
decentralized consensus systems (DCS) [25]. The first 
and most widely recognized decentralized 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin is a premier example, but there 
is a host of other alternative currencies (“altcoins"), 
including Litecoin, Peercoin, and Namecoin.  
IS studies on open platforms [26, 27] and openness 
in general [28] are highly useful in understanding the 
development of new payment platforms. Open 
platforms literature focuses on boundary resources and 
ways to increase third party participation to the design. 
Openness research has discussed governance of open 
source development communities [18]. Governance in 
this context is seen as the means of achieving the 
direction, control, and coordination of wholly or 
partially autonomous individuals and organizations on 
behalf of an OSS (open source software) development 
project to which they jointly contribute [29]. Open 
                                                
8 http://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-things-2/ 
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source research has addressed governance in three 
different ways: 1) different incentives for independent 
developers to participate in open efforts [30, 31] 2) as 
well as the efforts to provide support for the necessary 
coordination activities [32], and 3) encourage building 
a culture that welcomes open contributions [29]. Open 
source communities that produce implementations of 
blockchain technologies seem to invite actors not so 
common in more traditional open source communities, 
but many of the governance challenges seem similar. 
Even though distributed payment platforms are still 
a maturing technology, they are on the verge of 
becoming more widely accepted. This is demonstrated 
by, for example, the fact that in February 2016, Japan 
was considering legal changes that would define  
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to be treated as 
currencies.9   
While there are still a host of unresolved question 
related to digital payments and payment platforms in 
general – ranging from the trust issues to payment 
ecosystems – the decentralized nature of blockchain 
technology create a new set of so-far unaddressed 
research challenges that emerge when different 
platforms and services are designed, developed, 
introduced and eventually used.  
 
2.5. Research gap 
 
Based on our review of the extant literature, we 
conclude that there are clear research gaps in the state 
of the art related to these decentralized systems 
building on blockchain technology. There is an urgent 
call for research on both theoretical and practical 
perspectives on the blockchain technology.  
Many critical issues are related to the inherently 
decentralized nature of these payment systems and 
platforms. For example, how can both trust and 
anonymity be guaranteed in such a platform-mediated 
network, and how can the risks be identified and 
mitigated?  Only a better understanding of these risks 
and opportunities will lead to better, more trustworthy 
and more efficient services for citizens, consumers, as 
well as the range of organizations with interest in 
development of blockchain technologies.  
To understand the operation logic and ensuing 
opportunities and risks of blockchain technology 
services and platform, we propose focusing on 
organizational, environmental and technology factors. 
Organizational factors include the organization and 
management of the focal service or the platform, 
                                                
9http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/25/japan-to-
make-bitcoin-legal-currency 
 
including issues such as financial structure (the cost 
structure and profit potential [33] of the service) and 
the related pricing strategies, or in other words the 
underlying business model [34, 35]. 
Market environment, in turn, includes the demand – 
that is, the users - as well as the competition, in terms 
of both the direct competitors offering similar services, 
and the companies offering substitute services.  With 
technology factors we refer to the details of the ICT 
used, with a special interest in the design issues related 
to developing these systems. 
Information Systems Science research builds on a 
wide range of possible lines of enquiry and theories 
adopted most often from the disciplines of marketing, 
management and economics, but also others including 
sociology and law. Thus, we will refrain from 
formulating the research issues in the light of any 
specific theory or approach, but rather provide areas 
for further investigation and possible research 
questions. 
 
3. Research agenda 
 
In essence, the distributed payment systems and 
platforms and other service enabled by blockchain 
technology can be conceptualized as service 
innovations. These service innovations can be expected 
to either improve services productivity or to develop 
new service models [36]. A widely accepted definition 
of service innovation states that “a service innovation 
is a new service experience or service solution that 
consists of one or several of the following dimensions: 
new service concept, new customer interaction, new 
value system/business partners, new revenue model, 
new organizational or technological service delivery 
system.” [37]. Hence, we can understand service 
innovations as combination of technology innovation, 
business model innovation, social-organizational 
innovation and demand innovation with the objective 
to improve existing service systems (incremental 
innovation) or to create new value propositions 
(offerings) or create new service systems (radical 
innovation) [38]. Service innovations are, in general 
and in financial industry in particular often technology-
based: either the introduction of a new technology or a 
different use of existing technology. Whether 
decentralized digital currencies, such as bitcoin, are 
viewed as new-to-the-market or service line extension; 
or technology innovation or demand innovation; or 
some other type of service innovation, depends on the 
perspective adopted. Regardless of the perspective, the 
opportunities as well as risks are distinctly different 
from, for example, banks’ and legislators’ perspective 
to those of individual consumers or merchants. We 
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utilize concepts from service innovation literature [37, 
38]; together with the conceptualization of 
decentralized payments systems as platform-mediated 
networks in two (or many) sided markets [39-42] in 
drafting a research agenda.  
We will next outline a research agenda divided into 
three focus areas of 1) organizational issues; 2) issues 
related to the competitive environment; and 3) 
technology design issues. We will discuss several 
salient themes within each of the focus areas, and 
derive a set of research question for each theme, 
highlighting the need to address both risks and 
opportunities for citizens as consumers, as well as 
different types of organizations with a stake on the 
development or utilization of blockchain technologies. 
 
3.1. Organizational issues 
 
With blockchain technology, the most critical 
organizational issues for the time being are related to 
the digital payment platforms and in more detail, the 
network effects these kinds of platforms are subject to. 
Another set of organizational key questions can be 
derived from the new business models enabled and 
facilitated by blockchain technology. 
Digital payment platforms. Due to the nature of 
financial transactions, the maturation of the technology 
and more wide spread use will raise new 
organizational, legal and institutional issues. For 
example, while the ledgers are assumed to keep full 
histories and all the transactions are presumed “final” 
when settled, the processes are not unproblematic. For 
instance, there can be disputes over the finality of the 
transactions, or technology glitches and transaction 
delays can create a need for third parties and legal 
settlement. Several questions for research remain:  
 
• What novel technical and legal issues are 
related to blockchain technology service and 
platform contracts, ledgers and transactions? 
 
• How do these new institutional arrangements 
without central authority function? What are 
the implications to the users, different 
stakeholder organizations and societies in 
large? 
 
• How open are these platforms for 
contributions and participation? What 
incentives are there for third party 
developers?  
 
Network effects. Success of platform-mediated 
networks and services depends highly on the size of the 
user network [43].  Network effects are those positive 
or negative effects that one user’s actions have on 
another user’s valuation of the network [44]. In other 
words, the value of membership to one user is 
positively affected by another user joining and 
enlarging the network [45].  Decentralized payment 
platforms operate in many-sided markets, where the 
platform’s value to any given user depends also on the 
number of users on the network’s other side(s), and the 
value grows as the platform matches demand from 
different sides [39, 40]. To put it simply, the primary 
two sides related to payment platforms are the payers 
(e.g. consumers) and the payees (e.g. merchants). Both 
same-side effects (i.e., how valuable is the growth of 
the network for the users in the same side of the 
market) and the cross-side network effects (i.e., how 
valuable is the growth of the network on the other side) 
are highly relevant in the context of decentralized 
payments.   
In industries characterized by strong, positive 
network effects, a single platform can rise to 
dominance, locking out competing services [41]. 
Transaction and payment platforms are such that we 
can assume that there will be geographic and market 
differences that lead into a situation where there are 
several different players, but at the same time this is a 
volume business and together with the needed trust this 
will lead into situation, where a few dominant players 
will emerge and in many markets there will be only 
one platform available. This winning platform will not 
necessarily or very likely be owned or operated by a 
single player (such as a bank or a technology provider). 
Rather, the platform will be the de facto technical 
standard, similarly to for example mobile 
telecommunication, allowing for interoperability 
between different service providers. It should be a key 
research theme to try to understand how this will play 
out in different markets.  
Pricing strategy is a very interesting topic in this 
area. In two- or many-sided networks, pricing is 
complicated, as the platform providers have to choose 
a price for each side, factoring in the impact of the 
other side’s growth and willingness to pay [42]. The 
platform incurs costs in serving both groups of users 
and can collect revenue from each, although one side is 
most often subsidized [39]. A key issue here is to 
determine which side receives a discount. In credit card 
industry, for example, the industry norm is to subsidize 
consumers (even though not fully) and charge credit 
card accepting merchants more. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to expect that new entrants will compete on 
prices and speed of transactions. The ability to compete 
along these parameters will define the success and 
even survival of many of the actors in the industry. 
Host of research questions remain, including: 
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• Where are the networks effects on blockchain 
technology based payment platforms derived 
from and how strong are they? 
 
• How strong are the same-side and cross-side 
network effects on different market sides, 
including (at least) consumers and businesses 
accepting new types of payments? 
 
• What are the risks related to market power? 
What is the likelihood of a particular 
cryptocurrency becoming the dominant one, 
even to the extent of a monopoly?  
 
• What are the viable pricing strategies for 
decentralized services building on blockchain 
technology? Are they different from pricing 
strategies of other platform-mediated services 
in financial industry, and if so, how and why?  
 
• What are the possible viable strategies for the 
incumbent companies such as banks and 
telecommunications operators? Will they 
disrupt or be disrupted? 
 
New Business models. Decentralization,  blockchain 
technology and the underlying distributed database 
technologies offer possibilities also for new business 
models. For example, currency exchanges have 
emerged as an important gatekeeper role as 
clearinghouses taking care of conversion of 
cryptocurrencies to more traditional currencies.  The 
risks of such operations have been known for long, but 
became very noticeable when Mt. Gox, which handled 
around 70% of Bitcoin traffic dramatically filed for 
bankruptcy in 2014. To make matters worse, initially 
Bitcoin worth of around $450 million was found stolen 
from the bank in the process [46]. 
Moore and Christin [47] analyzed the defaults of 
these exchanges finding that their popularity and 
transaction volume reduce the risk of default (i.e., 
credit risk) [48].  Host of questions remain: 
 
• What kind of new business models 
decentralization and blockchain technology 
enable or facilitate?  Who will be able to 
develop and benefit from these new business 
models, various incumbents or new players? 
 
• What are the sustainable business models for 
the new intermediaries? How to provide 
viable revenue stream to the company while 
maintaining users’ trust of the intermediary? 
 
• What are the business and financial risks 
related to currency exchanges and who bears 
them? How can the risks be mitigated and 
managed?  
 
• What happened to Mt. Gox and how can such 
events be prevented in the future? 
 
 
3.2. Issues Related to Competitive 
Environment  
 
Financial services industry consists of a large 
number of long established incumbents, banks and 
credit card companies being traditionally the strongest 
players. Now, however, their dominance over payment 
services is increasingly challenged by entrance of 
various technology providers, both established (e.g. 
telecom operators) and totally new ones (e.g. mobile 
payment service providers, such as, iZettle10). It 
remains to be seen, how the incumbents and the new 
players will divide the market, and who will provide 
the services that the consumers are willing to accept 
and adopt. A closely related set of questions arise from 
the changes in consumers’ payment behavior, driven 
by the proliferation of new payment technologies and 
systems. 
 
Actors in the financial industry. New digital payment 
systems are not introduced to fill a previously 
nonexistent need, but instead in the heavily contested 
banking service landscape. Earlier research has noted 
that it is notoriously difficult to compete with the 
established incumbents in banking and telecom sectors, 
which are heavily protected by laws are regulations in 
most countries and regions [8, 49]. Reuver et al. [49] 
provide an interesting historical example of what could 
happen in such an institutional environment: banks 
viewed new payment systems as a way to reduce cash 
payments, but at the same time to protect their existing 
handling of consumer payments. Mobile operators on 
the other hand wanted to generate further revenues by 
using SIM cards for payer identification. The 
conflicting goals directly affected the negotiations on 
pricing, openness etc. of the platform strategy. Thus, 
new digital payment platforms face an uphill battle in 
the heavily regulated financial sector. This the 
institutional arrangements can be studied at least from 
the following viewpoints: 
 
                                                
10 https://www.izettle.com 
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• Which actors will emerge as the key players 
in the development of new payment systems 
and services? 
 
• What will be the different roles of the 
incumbents and the new entrants in the 
changing financial services industry?  
 
• What are the characteristics of new payment 
and trust systems that can radically alter the 
economics of payments? 
 
Consumers’ payment behavior. When examining the 
use of different information systems or technologies, 
IS research has traditionally focused on technology 
acceptance and adoption by the users (see e.g. [50, 
51]), in circumstances usually (ideally) involving large 
paradigmatic shifts in use behavior. Can we understand 
the adoption – or non-adoption, for that matter – of 
new payment technologies with the help of earlier 
tested technology acceptance models? If not, how the 
adoption should be theorized and understood in this 
context? 
For consumers, trust and context issues related to 
payments have been found to be of paramount 
importance [52]. By and large, consumers are reluctant 
and slow to change their payment behavior, but if the 
context is such that they find the new payment systems 
more convenient and/or cheaper than the old ones, the 
change can be quite rapid [52]. Most of the early 
adopters of Blockchain based cryptocurrencies have 
been technology enthusiasts, as expected. When the 
systems become more mainstream, the users need to be 
able to trust that there will not be significant volatility 
in the value of the currencies. Furthermore, the 
probability of any large-scale disruptions in the 
platform operations that can have instant negative 
effects must be substantially decreased before large 
scale adoption by the consumers is likely.  
Also understanding the homing costs of different 
decentralized payment systems is of great importance. 
If we are to see wider proliferation of one or more new 
cryptocurrencies, whether the consumers are likely to 
prefer mono-homing, that is, become a user of only one 
particular cryptocurrency, or are they more likely to 
prefer multi-homing, that is, the ability to use various 
payment methods is of great significance. This is 
largely dependent on the costs of adopting and using 
(and when necessary, terminating the use) of one or 
multiple alternatives. While homing costs of 
cryptocurrencies are relevant for the merchant side as 
well, the question is more crucial for the consumers 
with more limited resources. 
Interestingly, earlier studies have found evidence of 
the role of social influences in consumer behavior in 
different contexts [53, 54]. Also, fashion and trends 
have an effect on consumers’ buying behavior [55, 56]. 
Technology industry has seen its share of fashions and 
fads, throughout the years: some have been more 
persistent (e.g. social media, that was originally 
branded as a trend to die out soon), while some have 
disappeared before becoming more widely accepted 
(e.g. WAP services on early mobile (or feature) 
phones. Some interesting questions related to 
consumers’ payment behavior remain: 
 
• How the diffusion and adoption of blockchain 
technology based systems unfold among the 
consumers in different markets? 
 
• What technological or psychological 
characteristics affect the use of blockchain 
technologies and how? 
 
• What are the contextual issues that lead users 
to change their established trust providers or 
financial institutions?  
 
• What are the costs related to using one (or 
more than one different) new payment 
method? 
 
• What is the role of different social factors in 
proliferation of decentralized payment 
systems and cryptocurrencies? 
 
• What operational performance changes lead to 
adoption of the new systems? 
 
 
3.3. Technology Design Issues 
 
Instead of focusing on the technical developments 
of distributed transaction technology, we look at the 
design decisions and issues and provide avenues for 
building new service prototypes through design 
research. As this is new technology that changes long 
established patterns of user behavior in sensitive areas 
- such as, changing ownership of goods and monetary 
transactions - it is important to conduct trials in 
different kinds of settings and with different 
prototypes. This would naturally lead into using design 
research in forms such as Action Design Research that 
promote testing designs in real world settings and 
adjusting the artifacts during their testing [57].  
In a setting where the software platform has a clear 
owner, boundary resources are the resources provided 
by the platform owner to facilitate third-party 
development efforts [26]. These efforts aim at inviting 
additional contributions to the design and increased 
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access to the platform. These resources also provide 
means for the governance of contributions. More 
research is needed on the role of boundary resources 
for the different platforms which lack a clear owner or 
have a set of different actors jockeying for the design 
decisions, resources and governance power. 
Possible research questions related to the 
technology design issues are: 
 
• What are the possible new application areas 
for blockchain technology based computing 
platforms? 
 
• How are design decisions made in different 
systems relying on blockchain technology? 
 
• What are the features of these systems that 
enhance and/or decrease the trust of users 
towards the economic or regulatory systems 
that they implement? 
 
 
4. Discussion  
 
In this paper, we have outlined an initial research 
agenda and a set of questions for information systems 
research on blockchain technologies in payments. We 
reviewed the relevant (but still scarce) extant literature 
to identify and classify the challenges related to 
blockchain technology based platforms and services, 
with a particular focus on new decentralized payment 
systems, and developed a research agenda to support 
future research in this emergent area. 
To this end, we have provided a host of possible 
research questions related to different aspects of 
blockchain technologies. Even though the list is 
diverse, covering a large area of topics and domains, 
we do not claim it includes all relevant questions. On 
the contrary, we believe that many more are needed, 
and these need to be addressed from a multitude of 
perspectives, by researchers from different disciplines. 
Nevertheless, we are confident that the research agenda 
presented in this paper can serve as an inspirational 
starting point into an area that is likely to be important 
for research and for practice beyond our current 
comprehension. 
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